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Some questions concerning the National Park Service's
Washington Monument Security Improvements Project
1. |
NCPC's own "Projects Plan Submission Requirements, A1j requires "total estimated cost of the project and funding status." Has the National Park Service (NPS) submitted cost estimates? Can NCPC approve a project for which there are, as yet, no documented cost estimates?
The Coalition has reviewed the contracts that NPS signed in fall 2001 for Design/Build and there is mention of $29 million. But that estimate appears to make no mention of the tunnel, which will be by far the most expensive element to build. Tunnels are expensive to build, especially when they require digging near a structure like the Monument whose stability has historically been of concern to Congress and engineers. Also engineers tell us that the cost of maintenance for the tunnel will be very high.
We also wonder how much is being spent on the repeated changes to the design, instead of NPS ironing out the problems during the consultation process and THEN asking the architects to make new drawings and scale models.
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2. |
Are the engineering studies that evaluate the risk to the Monument's stability sufficient? Why did the NPS provide incomplete engineering and historical information to the engineering firm doing the Peer Review? Why did NPS submit only past studies that appear to support building the tunnel, and not the 1933 Report to Congress or the 1966 engineering report?
In 1933 Congress rejected engineers claims that the McMillan Plan concept of stairs and terraces at the Monument could be built; Congress said NO, unless the Monument were first dismantled and rebuilt to bedrock, or the foundation extended down to bedrock. The 1966 report is cautious about any excavation or loading of soil at and around the Monument. But instead of including the 1933 and 1966 reports, the NPS sent the Peer Review consultants only the 1973, 1984, and 2002 engineering reports done by Mueser Rutledge (MRCE). MRCE is the company already under contract to build the NPS's plan. |
3. |
How can NCPC accept the Executive Director's recommendation to approve part of the design but not the entire design, when all parts of the design are interrelated to a unified Security and Design Program?
Staff recommends approval of the walls, but not the tunnel. But if the tunnel is not approved that CHANGES THE PROGRAM, which could also change the need, design, or location of the walls. |
4. |
Why is NPS not following Park Service policies and procedures, e.g., Director's Order #2 and #12 regarding planning and NEPA? They've already had to backtrack once, when they issued a finding of "no adverse effect" before even doing needed studies to evaluate the project. |
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The Washington Monument
Summer, 2008, 2008 IG Report Finds "Culture of Expediency"
April, 2004, Latest Plans
March 17, 2004, Illegal Contract Sullies National Icon
Feb. 19, 2004, Judge Collyer decision on Guard Rails
Nov. 12, 2003, Coalition Calls for Halt to Guard Rails
Timeline
2003, Questions about NPS's Plans
NCPC Advances Plans for Washington Monument Guard Rails
"No significant impact" from tunnels, walls -- NCPC
CFA Tables NPS Plans for Monument
National Parks Conservation Association Letter to CFA
Sept. 16, 2002 Letter to Commission of Fine Arts
Full Text of FONSI Finding (pdf file)
NCPC Schedules Special Meeting August 15, 2002
July 27, 2002, NCPC Letter to Coalition re: FONSI
July 25, 2002, Coalition Responds to NPS Finding of No Significant Impact
July 25, 2002, Coalition Letter to NCPC re Environmental Assessment
May 21, 2002, Park Service Extends Comment Deadline
May 5, 2002, "Set record straight," coalition asks NCPC
May 22, 2002, NCPC Chairman Responds
May 1, 2002, Park Service Reaffirms Tunnel Decision
Feb. 28, 2002, Preservation Board Approves Tunnel Scheme
Text of Environmental Assessment
Public Responds to the Environmental Assessment
National Coalition to Save Our Mall
National Parks Conservation Association
The Committee of 100
National Trust for Historic Preservation
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